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Matthew, memory theory and the New No Quest
This article explores the effects of cognitive and social memory theory on the quest for the 
historical Jesus. It is not the case that all memory is hopelessly unreliable, but it is the case 
that it commonly is. Memory distortion is disturbingly common, and much worse, there is no 
way to distinguish between memories of actual events and memories of invented events. The 
Gospel of Matthew was used to illustrate this very difficulty. This article also draws attention 
to the fact that although numerous criteria have been developed, refined and used extensively 
in order to distinguish between original Jesus material and later church material, those criteria 
have long been unsatisfactory, and most recently, because of the effects of thinking about 
memory theory and orality, have been revealed to be bankrupt. Since memory theory shows 
that people are unable to differentiate accurate memory from inaccurate and wholly invented 
memory, and since the traditional quest criteria do not accomplish what they were intended 
to, this article argues that scholarship about Jesus has been forced into a new no quest.
Introduction
I once believed, and I have taught many students, that logical, rigorous and reasonable historical 
criteria could be applied to the sayings of Jesus, allowing us to reverse a process of accretion, 
adaptation and calcification in order to arrive at sometimes more and sometimes less reliable 
kernels of utterances that came directly from Jesus’ lips. In concert with the Jesus seminar, I was 
not over-optimistic about the number of these kernels: some things had been altered beyond 
recognition and others invented outright. In other words, when I encountered memory theory a 
number of years ago, I was not naïve about the outright invention of Jesus material among the 
earliest Christians. But I was utterly naïve about the way groups dis-remember the past. I admit I 
believed that the proper application of rigorous criteria could lead us to the reconstruction of the 
past as it actually happened.
 
As memory theory has entered into New Testament studies, a few shifts have emerged. There 
are some New Testament scholars who find in memory theory cause for confidence in the basic 
reliability of the Gospels (e.g. Dunn 2011; Gerhardsson 1961; Keener 2009; Le Donne 2011; McIver 
2011).1  Others on the other hand are decidedly more pessimistic (e.g. Allison 2012; Duling 2011; 
Kelber 2006; Kloppenborg 2012; Williams 2011). I count myself, obviously, among the latter group 
(Crook 2012, 2013). 
In defence of the former group of scholars, the transition in Memory Studies away from a default 
confidence in memory (or, thinking about memory as a stable process involving the straight-
forward retrieval of data from our memory bank) has been a gradual one (Winter 2012). What 
has replaced it, in so very much of the work on memory in the last 20 years, is the position that 
memory is not something that is retrieved but something that is reconstructed in every act of 
remembering. And it is in that act of reconstruction that memory is prone to failure and distortion. 
All memory theorists who work on distortion are quick to point out: to say that memory is prone 
to distortion does not mean that all memory is hopelessly distorted. But it does mean that the 
problem of memory distortion cannot be ignored and ought not to be minimised, which prior to 
1995 it had been (Schacter 1995a). I would contend that scholars who think that memory theory 
confirms the reliability of the Gospels have not adequately engaged the literature on memory 
distortion. Having said that, one would want to make clear that there is not only one way to 
respond to memory distortion – namely, throwing despairing hands into the air – as can be seen 
in the thoughtful work of Anthony Le Donne (2011), Chris Keith (2012) and Tom Thatcher (2006), 
among others. But it is the case that the characteristics of memory distortion are every bit as 
sobering as Dale Allison (2012) has recently lamented: 
1.I put these in the same group because they all attest to the basic reliability of the Gospels, even while some of them allow for 
imperfections of memory, and therefore allow for some modest degree of creativity.
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Memory is reconstructed as well as reproductive and so involves 
imagination. It deteriorates over time. It is typically a function of 
self-interest. It is sculpted by narrative conventions. It regularly 
moves events forward and backward in time. It is altered by 
post-event information. And it recurrently often assimilates to 
present circumstances. (p. 197)
Strategies of memory distortion
Memory distortion matters, but it took scholars a significant 
amount of time to come around to this fact (Roediger 
III 1996). This is likely because it is human tendency to 
trust memory: memory is so related to our perceptions of 
ourselves, the world around us and our place in it, that our 
memories normally feel strongly and reliably rooted inside 
us (Magnussen et al. 2007; Schacter 1996:308). Recent work in 
memory theory has challenged this notion. 
A decade before the serious work on memory distortion 
began, Hobsbawm and Ranger presented a short collection 
of essays on the wholesale invention of tradition. The essays 
in this volume focused on the British Commonwealth, from 
Highland and Welsh culture to Indian and African colonial 
experiences. Together the essays reveal that time and again, 
from location to location, traditions ‘which appear or claim 
to be old are often quite recent in origin and sometimes 
invented’ (Hobsbawm & Ranger 1983:1).
The mid-1990s brought a considerable increase in work on 
memory distortion (Baumeister & Hastings 1997; Geary 
1994; Loewen 1995; Roediger & McDermott 1995; Schacter 
1995b; Yapko 1994). Though not the earliest, I shall build the 
immediate conversation around the study by Roy Baumeister 
and Stephen Hastings, since it has a structure other attempts 
lack. Baumeister and Hastings offer a perceptive discussion of 
how groups distort the past. Their particular interest concerns 
the manner in which ‘memory can be manipulated for the 
purpose of collective self-deception’ (Baumeister & Hastings 
1997:277). Centrally important here is the agency exercised 
by groups in manipulating memory; this is different from 
accidental forgetting, which does not presume agency. This 
manipulation is deliberate because it is done for a purpose, 
usually to reflect well on the group. Baumeister and Hastings 
take it as axiomatic that ‘most social groups wish to maintain 
a positive image of themselves’, and I would add, of their 
founding figures (Baumeister & Hastings 1997:278).2
Baumeister and Hastings represent seven strategies or 
mechanisms for the deliberate distortion of collective memory. 
In order of degree of distortion, they are:
• linking versus detachment (presenting or adhering to, or 
rejecting, certain causal connections between events)
•  blaming the enemy (making your own misdeeds appear 
to be a measured reaction, for instance, rather than an 
over-reaction or unprovoked attack)
• blaming circumstances
• contextual framing
• selective omission of disagreeable facts
2.This same point was made by Hobsbawm, who related memory invention to the 
need for ‘socialization, the inculcation of beliefs, value systems and conventions of 
behaviour’ (Hobsbawm & Ranger 1983:9).
• exaggeration and embellishment
• outright invention of false memories.
Let me discuss each of these in turn. The first four of these 
tend not to change the past, they merely try to alter what 
the past means or how it unfolded. For example, when it 
comes to linking versus detachment, most major events 
have a complex constellation of causes. When a group 
wishes to control how a past event is understood (e.g. the 
invasion of a country), they might focus on only one cause 
(e.g. ethics), ignoring other causes (e.g. economics), in such 
a way that legitimises actions perhaps they are otherwise 
embarrassed about. When causes and effects are detached 
and re-attached, distortion naturally occurs. Thus, for some 
groups, the invasion of a country for their oil is a sign of 
corruption and greed, but doing so in order to save an 
oppressed people from a tyrannical leader is legitimate. 
This form of distortion is the most mild of these forms 
because the past is not re-written or invented so much as it 
is merely ‘spun’.
Another distortion strategy that does not deny a past event 
is one in which blame is directed at the enemy. This is 
commonly found in German explanations for the invasion of 
Russia: though Russia and Germany were, by treaty, allies, 
Germany often claims to have feared imminent attack from 
Russia, so they present their attack as justifiable, especially 
given their much smaller size.
If blaming the enemy is not an option, blaming circumstances 
might be – Baumeister’s and Hasting’s third strategy of 
memory distortion. The past event in question might still 
be embarrassing, but this strategy helps to shift blame away 
from one. Emphasising the ugliness of war and its odious 
collateral damage is an example of this. 
Fourthly, one’s context can determine how one distorts the 
past, since being a member of a group will outfit one with the 
most flattering version of events. Thus, Christians tended to 
remember the crusades as about freeing other Christians in 
Muslim lands, while Muslims have tended to remember the 
crusades as the first in a long line of unprovoked invasions. 
Clearly, the distorted memories of both groups are a 
symptom of their mutually exclusive contexts. 
These first four strategies of memory distortion are different 
from the three that follow because the first four do not 
attempt to change the past. With strategies such as linking 
or detaching, blaming the enemy, blaming circumstances 
and contextual framing, groups accept the occurrence of an 
embarrassing event. They do not deny the past, but their 
memory distorts it in order to reduce the embarrassment, or 
to explain in a distorting way why the event was necessary 
or justified. The next three strategies are much more highly 
distorting because they deal with the past by actively 
changing it.
 
Selective omission, as the name suggests, involves 
ignoring and sometimes denying certain events or 
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otherwise widely agreed-upon facts from the past.3  The 
frequency with which this strategy can be found in group 
narratives suggests it is easily executed.4  So, for instance, 
the collective memory of founding American figures such 
as Thomas Jefferson, Abraham Lincoln and Patrick Henry 
often omits the opinions and practices they had concerning 
slavery (Loewen 1995:146). Selective omission is not 
only a strategy of memory distortion for the American 
liberal left either: the American conservative right often 
selectively omits cameos of Jesus’ excoriating wealth and 
helping the poor from their collective memories of Jesus 
(O’Reilly & Dugard 2013). Michael Kammen (1995:333) 
shares this opinion about the distorting power of selective 
remembering: his study shows that ‘memories can 
readily, with scant embarrassment or challenge, be quietly 
repressed within a generation and replaced by alternate 
explanations’. Distorting collective memory for reasons of 
nationalistic cohesion or self-confidence or flattering self-
representation is found in countries the world over (see 
the works cited in Kammen 1995:340).
Exaggeration and embellishment can be mild strategies 
of memory distortion, like the earlier forms of distortion. 
But it is not difficult to imagine instances wherein 
exaggeration and embellishment could be extreme enough 
to result in the creation of a whole new memory, or at least 
a memory whose relationship to the original past event 
all but disappears. This potential is missed by Baumeister 
and Hastings who limit the effects of exaggeration and 
embellishment. For example, crediting Christopher 
Columbus with ‘discovering’ North America when 60 
million people already lived here is clearly moderately 
distortive. But one can just as easily exaggerate or embellish 
an event so extensively that it becomes a unique event. 
One could speculate whether something like this might 
stand behind some of the miracles of Jesus, wherein a few 
people fed as an act of radical commensality becomes a 
feeding of several thousand with a few loaves. 
The final and most extreme strategy of memory distortion 
is the outright invention of memory for events that never 
happened. Here is where Baumeister and Hastings are 
least satisfactory; they offer one example only, and 
conclude that ‘outright fabrication of collective memory 
is rare’ (Baumeister & Hastings 1997:282). Two features 
are problematic about this claim. The first concerns what 
is meant by ‘fabrication’? As I noted earlier, at what point 
is a memory so thoroughly exaggerated or embellished 
that it becomes a new and thereby fabricated memory? 
The more serious problem with their claim about rarity, 
however, is that the outright fabrication of memory is far 
more common than they allow.
It is not hard to see how wrong Baumeister and Hastings 
were concerning the rarity of fabricated collective memory: 
3.When Jan Assmann (1995:366) refers to the eradication of memory as the ‘most 
extreme form of distortion’, he clearly has more in mind than merely selective 
omission.
4.It warrants clarifying that forgetting is not precisely the same phenomenon as 
selective remembering, yet it is clearly related to it. It is therefore interesting that 
so few address forgetting as a form of memory distortion (Esposito 2008).
if nothing else, they might have considered some of the 
patently implausible things groups have believed over 
the centuries, for example, that Jewish men menstruate, 
that a snake spoke to the first woman, that the Torah 
was translated from Hebrew into Greek identically by 72 
scholars in 72 days, that the world was created by the slaying 
of a giant serpent. The list can easily be lengthened tenfold. 
The study by Hobsbawm and Ranger was not missed by 
the various authors found in the Schacter volume (1995b), 
but it appears to have been missed entirely by Baumeister 
and Hastings, to their serious detriment. People have been 
deeply committed to untruth, to the utterly fantastic since 
the beginning of time, and they continue to be.
Michael Schudson has also contributed to the discussion of 
the processes and strategies of memory distortion (Schudson 
1995). He offers four of them:
• distanciation
• instrumentalisation
• narrativisation
• cognitivisation and conventionalisation.
Distanciation starts with the obvious point that with time 
there is a loss of detail as memory grows more vague 
and there is a concomitant loss of emotional intensity. 
But Schudson (1995:350) points out that it is not all about 
loss. Distanciation also gives one a sense of historical 
perspective, an ability to view an event from multiple 
perspectives. In fact, historians are often ‘obliged to rewrite 
history as social values change’. Indeed, a historian who 
does not write about slavery from the position that it is 
bad is not a historian, but merely an antiquarian, that is 
‘someone for whom there is no vital connection between 
present values and telling the story of past events’, he 
suggests (Schudson 1993:54).
Instrumentalisation involves the use of the past for 
some particular purpose. First order instrumentalisation 
promotes a specific version of the past, while second order 
instrumentalisation makes use of the past without favouring 
any particular version. When the past is either taken over or 
manipulated in order to accomplish something specific, it 
does not even have to be the distant past. On the eve of 
the first Gulf War (1991), George H.W. Bush executed a 
policy that prohibited photographing flag-draped coffins 
returning deceased American soldiers. This in fact amounts 
to proactive memory distortion: Bush Senior felt that 
support for the war would suffer when Americans saw how 
many soldiers were dying, so he pre-emptively distorted 
American memory of that war. 
Narrativisation occurs by necessity, since the past is most 
commonly packaged into: 
[A] narrative, a story, with a beginning, middle, and end; with 
an original state of equilibrium, a disruption, and a resolution; 
with a protagonist and obstacles in his or her way and efforts to 
overcome them. (Schudson 1995:355)
When the past is forced into a narrative pattern, it will need 
to be distorted in order to fit. And of course, the past needs 
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to be made interesting, otherwise why bother remembering 
it? Schudson (1995) refers to the ways in which Watergate
is ‘remembered’ differently in different narrativisations. 
The memory of the Washington Post journalists Woodward 
and Bernstein, contained in All the President’s Men, depicts 
them as heroes instrumental in the victory of a liberal 
investigative press (Schudson 1995:356). The movie version 
of this book helped to ensure that this would become the 
broader collective memory of the event. Textbooks, on the 
other hand, present the event as a battle between the three 
branches of government – executive, judicial, and legislative 
– entirely ignoring the role of media. 
Cognitivisation and conventionalisation require us to 
remember that humans are doing the remembering, and 
humans tend to remember according to conventions that 
are provided to them, remembering that memory, even 
individual memory, is social (Schudson 1995:358). People’s 
own memories are shaped less by their actual experiences 
than by what they are socialised to think they are supposed to 
have experienced (Schachtel 1947). This applies to collective 
memory as well, and is aided by institutions: for something 
to be remembered, it has first to be remembered at all, in 
contrast to the myriad things not remembered at all. One 
form of conventionalisation is memorialisation, a process 
that always leaves someone feeling left out. In Canada, a 
plan to create a private Holocaust Museum was derailed 
when the Federal Government became involved and wanted 
to replace it with a National Museum of Human Rights. Since 
then, every conceivable group wants to have their tragedies 
represented, and those that are selected complain that the 
representation is insufficient, insulting, or dishonouring 
(Hamilton 2013). They all know, it seems, as Schudson did, 
that ‘turning something into a monument changes the past 
in that very process’ (Schudson 1995:359). Ann Rigney (2008) 
observes that:
While putting down a monument may seem like a way of 
ensuring long-term memory, it may in fact turn out to mark 
the beginning of amnesia unless the monument in question is 
continuously invested with new meaning. (p. 345)
It perhaps hardly needs to be pointed out that these strategies 
of distortion are not mutually exclusive. Consider the 
collective memory of Austria’s role in the Holocaust. After 
the war, Austria was offered by the Allies – and quickly 
embraced – the role of first and heroic resister to Nazism. 
By 1955, Austria’s enthusiastic embrace of Nazism and its 
profound role in the Holocaust were all but forgotten, as 
Austria was cast in the role of victim of and resister against 
Germany (Miller 1990:68). The distorted memory was fully in 
place by 1965, and was articulated in the movie The Sound of 
Music (1990:61–62). Here of course is an instance of memory 
distortion that was as much effected by instrumentalisation 
as it was by narrativisation. A sanitised past held a central 
function in many nations’ desire (Austria was not the only 
one) to put the horrors of the Holocaust and anti-Semitism 
behind them. The result was a narrativisation of the past that 
cast Austria as victim and noble freedom fighter. 
More recently in the study of memory distortion, Roediger 
and McDermott (2000) offer in addition six factors in the 
distortion of memory. They begin by suggesting that there are 
two general classes of errors in remembering: omission and 
commission. Omission is the failure to recollect a prior event 
when one tries to, while commission is the remembrance 
of events quite differently from the way they actually 
happened, or more seriously, ‘they remember an event that 
never happened at all’ (Roediger & McDermott 2000:149).
Memories of events that never happened are an upsetting 
and unsettling notion for many people. It contradicts our 
powerfully intuitive and personal experience of memory. 
Roediger and McDermott (2000) acknowledge this: 
People would like to believe that their memories are more or less 
accurate renditions of the experiences that occurred to them in 
the past. How could a memory for an event be ‘false’? Where 
would the recollection come from, if not from stored traces of 
actual events? (p. 149)
Roediger and McDermott (2000) collect six factors leading to 
memory distortion:
1. Relatedness effects occur when people experience a series 
of events that are strongly related; the relatedness of the 
events causes them to create memories that fit into that 
series but did not actually happen. This happens also 
when people use their general knowledge of the world to 
fill in gaps in their memory. Thus, when trying to recall a 
disjointed or meaningless series of events, people will fill 
in the gaps in order to introduce coherence and meaning 
based on what must have happened.
2. Interference effects occur when a critical event suffers 
interference from the memory of events just prior 
to (proactive interference) or just after (retroactive 
interference) it. Interference can also happen with the 
introduction of new information or the asking of leading 
questions – a form of contamination.
3. Effects of imagining refer to false memories one can 
develop by repeatedly imagining an event for which one 
was not present. Similarly, repeatedly imagining an event 
that never happened can eventually produce the memory 
that it did actually happen (see also Ceci 1995:97–98).
4. Retrieval and guessing effects: the act of repeatedly 
retrieving a false memory produces a strong cognitive 
sense of having been present at events people were not 
present at. In this instance, the person is told the memory 
is false, but is asked to retrieve the memory repeatedly.
5. Effects of social contexts refer to the social pressure 
people experience to conform to the memory of the 
group. One particular measure in this regard is called 
the ‘conformity paradigm’: ‘the greater the number of 
confederates whose erroneous responses preceded that of 
the actual subject, the more likely the actual subject was 
to conform to the erroneous group judgment’ (Roediger 
& McDermott 2000:157).
6. Individual differences factor is very simple: some people 
are more susceptible than others to memory distortion, 
such as the very young and the very old. 
Roediger and McDermott point out that people in real life 
situations are susceptible to many of the same effects of 
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memory distortion as are people in clinical tests. Many 
studies show how this is so with eyewitnesses to crimes, for 
instance. And yet, human nature is determined to accept 
eyewitness testimony as reliable.5  These studies of memory 
distortion simply do not support such confidence (or benefit 
of the doubt). The same can happen with memories recovered 
in a variety of therapeutic environments.
The unreliability of gist memory
It is natural and common to imagine that while memory for 
details might weaken over time, memory for the gist of an 
event will be much more durable and reliable. This arises 
in biblical studies in the increasingly common claim that 
since gist memory is more reliable than detail memory, we 
can trust the Gospel writers to have maintained the gist of 
material from and about Jesus, even if minor details vary 
or have been lost (Bailey 1991; Dunn 2003; Keener 2009; Le 
Donne 2011; McIver 2011). And while it is indeed the case 
that the brain performs better at the level of gist memory 
than detailed memory, it turns out that this is not by much. 
Gist memory is also susceptible to memory distortion. 
Consider the following studies, which though they are 
local are replicated countless times around the world 
and throughout history. Above I referred to a study of 
how Austrian collective memory about their national 
collaboration with Nazi Germany departs significantly from 
the well-documented historical record. The ‘gist’ of Austria’s 
sanitised story is that they were Europe’s first resisters of 
Nazi Germany’s anti-Semitic views. The details of history 
are that Austria enthusiastically embraced Hitler’s Final 
Solution, that three-quarter of Nazi prison camp guards were 
Austrian, and that Austria had more Nazi party members 
per capita than did Germany (Miller 1990:63–68). For several 
decades after the war, Austrian collective memory did not 
retain even the ‘gist’ of their actual past. That past had been 
distorted and forgotten to the extent that a new gist memory 
had taken its place. Gist memory is not less prone to the 
strategies and forms of distortion we saw above. 
Similarly, Jan Assmann compares the way Egyptian and 
Ancient Israelite sources remember the encounter between 
the two groups in the 14th century BCE, noting how 
fundamentally different they are (Assmann 1995). Egyptian 
memory depicts the Hebrews as cruel oppressors who were 
an abomination to the gods. Israelite memory depicts peaceful 
Hebrews acting as responsible citizens until they were 
enslaved without cause by the evil Egyptians. Assmann’s 
observation is that the location in which a reconstruction (or 
representation of the past) happens fundamentally shapes the 
memory, and the gist is utterly lost in the process. There is no 
shared ‘gist’ between the Egyptian and Israelite versions of 
this encounter. One might object that the ‘gist’ of the stories 
is that ‘someone felt threatened by someone else and violence 
was the result’ but this is so banal it surely cannot serve as the 
gist of this story.
5.Conversely, see Redman (2010).
Peter Burke (1989) considers historical figures to which 
myths adhere, and how frequently the origin of these myths 
is not to be found in things these people actually did. He 
writes that:
[T]he central element in the explanation of this mythogenesis 
is the perception (conscious or unconscious) of a ‘fit’ in some 
respect or respects between a particular individual and a current 
stereotype of a hero or villain – ruler, saint, bandit, witch, or 
whatever. (p. 104) 
Figures can be naturally transformed in the process of 
executing this fit: 
The transformation of the cold and colourless William III into the 
popular Protestant idol ‘King Billy’ can hardly be explained in 
terms of his own personality … Bandits turn into Robin Hoods, 
robbing the rich to give to the poor. Rulers travel their kingdom 
in disguise to learn about the condition of their subjects. (Burke 
1989:104)
In other words, groups regularly distort the ‘gist’ of their 
memories of their heroes and villains. 
Finally, here is an example from the modern period and 
one that concerns the distortion of individual memory 
rather than collective memory. Stephen Ceci presents the 
interesting story about a 1967 Major League Baseball pitching 
incident that ended the career of a young promising player, 
and nearly killed him at the time. In 1990, upon the death 
of the injured player, the pitcher was interviewed, offering 
his recollection of that fateful game and what transpired 
afterwards. He recalls that, given the situation within 
the game, there would be no reason for a pitcher to harm 
or intimidate a batter, and that as a sign of his remorse, he 
tried to see the player immediately after the game, but only 
family were being admitted. Ceci points out that these two 
game-related memories of the pitcher are wholly inaccurate, 
and in addition are self-serving. In fact, the game was at a 
point where intimidating a good player was expected, which 
suggests not that the pitcher intended to harm, but that 
perhaps harm was a result of an aggressive play. And Ceci 
points out that the game happened in the evening, so a visit 
to the hospital immediately following was likely not even 
attempted. He concludes, for all that the pitcher claimed to 
have thought about that day many times and regretfully, 
‘he seems to have gotten the story wrong, not only in its 
peripheral details, but in its gist, its core truths’ (Ceci 1995:92).
Distorted versus undistorted 
memory
I will avoid applying a quantifying adverb to the frequency 
with which memory is manufactured or heavily distorted 
– rarely, frequently, commonly – for two reasons. Firstly, 
because doing so is impossible. It is impossible to compare 
the number of manufactured memories people hold to the 
number of accurate memories in order to arrive at a ratio 
that is in any way meaningful. Still, I must point out that 
manufactured memories are maintained with far greater 
frequency, and with far more damaging effects, than 
Baumeister and Hastings (1997) care to admit. It also needs to 
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be pointed out that one can acknowledge how frail and easily 
manipulated memory is while at the same time maintaining 
– with all memory theorists – that memory is often quite 
reliable. The second reason that attempting a quantifying 
adjective is to be avoided is that it misses the far more 
troubling point: that distinguishing between manufactured 
memories and accurate memories is nearly impossible. It is 
impossible both for the outsider attempting to distinguish 
between them and for the person who holds these memories. 
Baumeister and Hastings suggest that groups might revise 
their self-appraisals in the light of facts. This can happen of 
course, as institutional and national apologies for slavery, 
war crimes and ethnic cleansing attest. But it can just as 
frequently happen that beliefs about the past are held to 
tenaciously in opposition to all known and readily accessible 
facts. Research into memory shows that people cannot 
distinguish between their own reasonably accurate memories 
and their own distorted or manufactured memories.6 
Once memories are fitted into a coherent narrative, actual 
memories, distorted memories and manufactured memories 
become indistinguishable from one another. If this is so 
for the people whose memories they are, how much more 
challenging must it be for outside observers, or when reading 
a fictionalised biography, to distinguish between more and 
less accurate memories?
In a classic study, subjects were given a passage about a wild, 
stubborn, and violent girl (Sulin & Dooling 1974). In some 
versions of the passage, the girl was named Helen Keller, in 
other versions she was called something else. The passage 
contained seven lines, each of which focused exclusively on 
Keller’s behavioural issues (wild, stubborn and violent), and 
on how her parents coped with them. There is no reference 
at all to this person being deaf, mute, or blind. After a week, 
subjects were asked to look at seven lines and report both 
which lines were in what they originally read, and which 
lines were new. In each case, there was a new line added: 
‘She was deaf, dumb, and blind.’ Subjects for whom the girl 
was named Helen Keller were significantly more likely than 
the other group to identify this line as having been part of the 
original passage, and to do so with a high degree of certainty. 
But of course, that line was not there, and subjects for whom 
the girl was named otherwise were more likely to know that. 
So, Sulin and Dooling concluded that Frederick Bartlett’s 
observations that people remember by fitting what they 
encounter into pre-existing schemata has been confirmed. 
The subjects all knew Helen Keller as having been deaf, 
mute and blind, so they naturally and confidently felt that 
the line describing her well-known condition was there all 
along. This happens because remembering is never a process 
of merely retrieving data from storage. Rather, ‘information 
in the retrieval environment contributes to, and is often 
part of, the subjective experience of remembering’ (Schacter 
1995a:16). This explains why humans tend to have such a 
6.One ought also to avoid the facile rejoinder that since all memory is distorted there 
is no way to distinguish ‘accurate’ from ‘manufactured memories’. It is certainly 
true that all memory is distorted, but it does not follow that all memory is equally 
distorted. Jan Assmann puts it best: although all memory is clearly to some degree 
reconstructed and reinvented, ‘it is equally clear that … some memories are more 
distorted than others and some traditions more invented than others’ (Assmann 
1995:366).
high regard for the reliability of their memories: because we 
are so intertwined with the subjective experience of episodes 
in our lives, and therefore with our identity.
Stephen Ceci refers to a study in which children were 
persuaded that they had once caught their hand in a 
mousetrap so badly they had to go to the hospital (Ceci 
1995). With repeated questioning about the event, 25% of 
the children concocted very coherent narratives about the 
experience, such that even professional psychologists who 
viewed videos of the accounts were unable to tell that the 
memories the children had were entirely manufactured. Ceci 
(1995:103) concludes that ‘at least some of these children had 
come to believe that they actually experienced the fictitious 
events’. No less than 27% of the children refused to accept, 
upon debriefing, that in fact their memories were entirely 
false. They objected that they ‘remembered’ the events 
in question (see also the studies referred to in Schacter 
1996:108–110).
Elizabeth Loftus (with various co-authors over her long 
career) has conducted a similar study multiple times, in 
which adults remember a time they were lost in a shopping 
mall as young children. After several retellings, many of the 
adult subjects started producing notably detailed accounts of 
this experience that they never had: the voice of the person 
who helped them, the feel and smell of their sweater, the 
relief and concern of their mother, and so on. Loftus shows 
time and again that we lack the ability ‘to reliably distinguish 
between real and false memories, for without independent 
corroboration, such distinctions are generally not possible’ 
(Loftus & Pickerell 1995:725).7
Jan Assmann discusses a case in which a man’s memories 
of spending time at Auschwitz had no basis in fact. Yet, 
astutely, Assmann does not call the man’s autobiography a 
‘forgery’. These ‘memories’, he suggests, are central to the 
man’s identity, in which he has constructed his experience 
of the world, and his sense of victimhood. Those memories 
explain to him who he is. This, according to Assmann (2006), 
shows that:
[I]t is possible for someone to believe in all sincerity that he has 
experienced something which in reality he has only read or heard 
about and absorbed in the course of collective communicative 
processes. (p. 4)
Loftus (1993) asks: ‘If a memory is recovered that is not 
authentic, where would it come from? There are many 
possibilities, she concludes: 
If not authentic, the memories could be due to fantasy, illusion, or 
hallucination-mediated screen memories, internally derived as a 
defense mechanism ... a mixture of borrowed ideas, characters, 
myths, and accounts from exogenous sources with idiosyncratic 
internal beliefs ... Inauthentic memories could also be externally 
derived as a result of unintentional implantation of suggestion 
by a therapist or other perceived authority figure with whom the 
client desires a special relationship, interest, or approval. (p. 524)
7.On the other hand Kim and Cabeza (2007) demonstrate that that neuro-correlates, 
mapped using f-MRIs, are different in high-confidence real memories and high-
confidence false memories. For more on the ability of adults to manufacture memories 
see Hyman and Pentland (1996), Johnson et al. (1979), and Garry et al. (1996).
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In other words, memories can be manufactured from 
any number of sources, both external and internal, both 
accidentally and deliberately. But the most important feature 
of such memories is that ‘[o]nce activated, the manufactured 
memories are indistinguishable from factual memories’ 
(Loftus 1993:524). Implanted memory in adults of a fictitious 
childhood event can be tenaciously maintained even in 
debriefing (Loftus & Pickerell 1995:724). This is because 
the act of remembering is a deeply ‘subjective experience’; 
memory carries as great an impact when it is veridical as 
when it is not (Dalla Barba 1993:15).
Memories of Jesus in the Gospel 
of Matthew
The preceding has established two features of memory: (1) 
that although memory is often reliable, it is also frequently 
unreliable and can be distorted deliberately and accidentally, 
to or by oneself and by others; and (2) that accurate, distorted 
and manufactured memories are pretty much impossible 
to distinguish from each other, for the person who holds 
the memory but even more so for the outside observers of 
those memories. If the New Testament Gospels are artefacts 
of memory, and they must surely be, then we are obligated 
to wonder: how might the preceding work on memory 
distortion affect our reading of the Gospels and the scholarly 
search for the historical Jesus.
Let us consider briefly the following ten episodes in 
Matthew: the slaughter of the innocents and the flight to 
and from Egypt (2:13–22); the baptism of Jesus (3:13–17); 
the lengthy sermon delivered on a mountain (5–7); the 
stilling of a storm (8:23–27); the parable of the mustard 
seed (13:31–32); feeding five thousand (14:13–21); the key 
commandments (22:34–40); the Jewish mob calling for the 
blood of Jesus (27:24–26); the tombs opening and the dead 
walking around the city of Jerusalem (27:51b–53); and 
finally the resurrection of Jesus (28:9–10).
Of this list, four are exclusively supernatural events: stilling 
the storm, feeding five thousand, the tombs opening and 
the resurrection. The remaining six are relatively mundane. 
That is to say, four of the stories likely did not occur as 
recorded (and possibly have no basis in reality at all), while 
the remaining six could be based on actual events in the 
life of Jesus because they represent real world experiences: 
persecution and flight, baptism, a speech, a parable, a key 
teaching and a bloodthirsty mob. These are not the only 
stories in the Gospel of Matthew that might be based on 
events from the life of Jesus, but they are representative. 
Here is what these stories tell us about memory distortion.
It is possible that Jesus’ family was forced to flee into 
another country because of persecution threatening their 
child. This happens to people everywhere. Yet the story 
contains patently unhistorical elements. Some these 
elements are mundane – that Jesus was born in Bethlehem 
(Brown 1993:513–16; Miller 2003:184; Vermès 2006:88); that 
Herod would be forced to rely solely on foreign Magi to find 
a child who presents such a threat to him (Miller 2003:110); 
and the slaughter that Matthew depicts (Brown 1993:189; 
Miller 2003:184; Robinson 2009:127; Vermès 2006:115). Other 
elements are unhistorical because they are supernatural 
(e.g. dreams and visions). It is worth pointing out that there 
is no significant scholarly disagreement here: the range of 
opinion is that Matthew either invented the slaughter story 
outright (Goulder 1974:239–241), or that he embellished it 
(France 1979:108–120; Hagner 1993:35). Either way, we see 
memory distortion at work, as presented above.
Consider the story of Jesus’ baptism. It is nearly universally 
agreed that the historical Jesus was baptised by John the 
Baptist (Funk 1998:528–529; Sanders 1993:10; Theissen & 
Merz 1998:212; Webb 2009:112), and yet into this likely 
historical event, Matthew inserts a redactional explanation 
(vv. 14–15) about how the Son of God came to need a 
baptism of repentance for the forgiveness of sins. That this 
section is Matthean redaction is suggested strongly by the 
fact that the two verses contain key theological concerns 
and vocabulary of Matthew (Davies & Allison 1988:1.323; 
France 2007:119–120; Luz 2007:142; Turner 2008:118; Webb 
2009:133, n. 129), but also and especially that we see here 
Matthew’s solution to the theological problem posed by 
Jesus’ baptism by John. How telling that the first words of 
Jesus ‘remembered’ by Matthew are likely Matthew’s own 
theological invention.
Finally, let us consider the Matthean blood libel (27:24–25).8 
Here is another story that could have happened, in that it is 
mundane, yet most scholars consider it another Matthean 
creation. Matthew has Pilate enact a highly symbolic and 
public act of washing his hands of Jesus’ blood, and the 
Jewish crowd calls for that blood to be upon them and 
their children. As with the examples above, the style in this 
passage is uniquely Matthean, and not surprisingly few 
modern scholars accept the historicity of what is depicted 
in the insertion (Beare 1962:236; Brown 1994:833; Crossan 
1995:157;  Levine 2002:91; Luz 2005a, 2005b:58).9  Matthew 
27:24–25 represents Matthew’s escalation of his anti-Jewish 
polemic and his exoneration of the Romans. 
These various episodes reflect many of the features of 
memory distortion presented above. Firstly, there are 
memories in Matthew that cannot have happened: the dead 
walking around the streets of Jerusalem, Jesus rising from 
the dead are two obvious Matthean examples of wholly 
manufactured memories, among many. Baumeister and 
Hastings are alone in the opinion that fabrication is rare. 
It is not rare, even if it is not the norm. Memories can also 
be manufactured in people because of what Roediger and 
McDermott called the ‘effects of social contexts’ (presented 
above). Any manufactured memory in Matthew has two 
8.For the sake of argument, I would like to consider the Sermon on the Mount, the 
parable of the mustard seed (13:31–32), and the key Commandment (22:34–40) 
as events that go back to the life of Jesus. Though there are redactional and 
composition issues, they need not concern us in this context.
9.Aponizō is hapax in the New Testament; apenanti is found 2 times in Matthew, not 
at all in the other Synoptic Gospels (though 2 times in Acts); athōos occurs 2 times 
in Matthew, but not in the rest of the New Testament.
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potential sources: either the author of Matthew himself has 
invented it, or he inherited it from his circle. If the latter, 
then we have an instance of social context resulting in a 
distorted, or manufactured memory.
Secondly, there are memories in Matthew that were 
obviously significantly altered from a potential original. 
Matthew’s theological apology for John’s baptism is a 
powerful example. Here is an event that is almost certainly 
historical, yet Matthew has altered the memory in order to 
improve it. We might call this linking and detaching. If Jesus 
was originally one of John’s disciples, baptised for the same 
reason everyone else was baptised, then it is predictable that 
Jesus’ own followers would detach the baptism from that 
original explanation and attach it to another. This might also 
be an example of Schudson’s ‘instrumentalisation’. Here 
Matthew is using the baptism within his narrative, the point 
of which, as with any bios must surely be to persuade readers 
towards emulation. In the use of the story, theologically 
troublesome features get distorted. Other memories, such 
as the feeding of the five thousand could be an example of 
exaggeration and embellishment. When Matthew has Jesus 
ride a donkey into Jerusalem, fitting the story so perfectly 
that it mirrors Zechariah, this is an example of Roediger’s 
and McDermott’s ‘relatedness effect’. 
A third feature of these stories that is consistent with 
what we have seen above is the most troubling feature 
of all. Consider this: plenty of scholarly debates exist 
concerning the historical accuracy of many Matthean 
events, of course. This debate, however, exists not with 
any assistance from Matthew, but in spite of him. Without 
exception, each of the Matthean stories above is presented 
unqualifiedly as absolutely true, an actual event in the life 
of Jesus. Matthew does not indicate that he thinks the dead 
walking about Jerusalem might be less reliable a memory 
than Jesus’ having spoken the parable of the mustard seed. 
There is nothing in the prose of each narrative that suggests 
Matthew might think differently about those two episodes. 
Since there is no marking by which Matthew indicates he 
might think some of his stories are somewhat less likely 
than others, on what basis can modern scholars say that 
the dead perambulating Jerusalem (Mt 27:54) is not likely 
an actual event, but the parable of the mustard seed was? 
Or that the parable of the mustard seed was performed by 
Jesus, but that Matthew 27:25 was composed by the author 
of Matthew? The writer of the Gospel of Matthew presents 
collective memories of Jesus: some of them are obviously 
not real. The question is: How do we tell the difference? 
Answered simply: we cannot tell the difference.
The writer of the Gospel of Matthew is, of course, not alone 
among ancient historians in maintaining, distributing and 
possibly inventing distorted memories. One Maccabees 
12:20–23 presents evidence, in the form of a letter from the 
Spartan King Arias to Onias, the 4th century BCE high priest, 
that Spartans and Jews both descended from Abraham. 
While this claim is clearly fantastic, what is decidedly 
more interesting is that Josephus passes on this memory as 
history (AJ 12.225–227). That is, Josephus considers the letter 
historical; he does not have at his disposal the tools (or he 
lacks the inclination) to doubt the veracity of the claim. Earlier, 
Josephus reports the historical event of Alexander the Great’s 
encounter with the Temple. Alexander, marched in anger 
against Jerusalem for its disloyalty, but upon coming face 
to face with the splendour of the high priest in the Temple, 
Alexander fell to his knees and wept (AJ 11.317–339). So, just 
as we have in Matthew, Josephus presents possibly reliable 
accounts of the past side-by-side with certainly unhistorical 
accounts, and in some instances, as in Matthew, sometimes 
with a considerable amount of extremely vivid detail.10 
Memory, criteria, and the quest
For most of the last century of Jesus scholarship, the primary 
tool available to scholars for distinguishing between 
historically reliable and historically unreliable material was 
the traditional form-critical criteria developed over the new 
and third quests: multiple independent attestation, double 
dissimilarity, embarrassment, rejection, coherence and 
so on. But a recent and extremely important collection of 
essays has dismantled the usefulness of these criteria (Keith 
& Le Donne 2012).
According to Keith and Le Donne, and a small group of 
predecessors, the traditional quest for the historical Jesus 
is characterised by the quest to reconstruct the original, 
authentic words of Jesus using criteria of which the foundation 
is form criticism. The foundational assumption behind form 
criticism is that there is a linear trajectory from a speech event 
originating with Jesus to the written Gospels after him, and 
that this trajectory involves a fairly predictable process of 
accretion, alteration and adaptation. Because the process is 
fairly predictable, criteria – such as those just mentioned – 
can be applied to the final product in order to reverse this 
process of accretion, alteration and adaptation. The process 
having been reversed, scholars can arrive at an original core 
of what Jesus said, or reject the saying as unhistorical, as with 
the Jesus seminar. 
There are multiple problems with this approach. Firstly, and 
most seriously, the search for one authentic form of a Jesus 
saying ignores that Jesus would have delivered any speech or 
story multiple times, and if he was any good at all at his trade, 
each delivery would have been a little different. Therefore, it 
is in fact impossible to speak of an original version, as every 
performance would be an original.11  Secondly, this one fact 
has a direct bearing on our ability to neatly separate tradition 
(Jesus) from interpretation (later Christians): it cannot be 
done. Thirdly, memory theory contributes to this particular 
point as well: since all remembering requires interpretation 
and framing, separating tradition (what is remembered) from 
interpretation (how it is remembered) is flatly impossible. 
As Keith (2012:39) observes, ‘[i]f not for those [interpretive] 
frameworks, the past would not survive at all.’  Elizabeth 
Tonkin (1992) makes the same point when she observes that:
10.See the astute analysis of these, and other, episodes in Gruen (1993).
11.Kelber (2006:17). For more on oral tradition in the New Testament, see the new 
and outstanding work by Rodríguez (2013).
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Professional historians who use the recollections of others cannot 
just scan them for useful facts to pick out, like currants from a 
cake. Any such facts are so embedded in the representation that 
it directs an interpretation of them, and its very ordering, its 
plotting, and its metaphors bear meaning too. (p. 6)
Because of these issues, Keith, Le Donne and their able 
contributors declare the criteria approach to the Quest for 
the historical Jesus dead, unable to complete the task for 
which it was created. In other words, the criteria cannot be 
used to distinguish between the authentic memory which we 
hope and expect is in the Gospels and the manufactured or 
distorted memory which we know is in the Gospels. Where 
does that leave us? With a New No Quest.
Memory theory shows us that it is impossible to distinguish 
between real and distorted memories. And Keith and Le 
Donne show that the tools we always thought could be 
used for that purpose are irreparably broken. The search for 
authenticity was the heart of the New and Third quests for 
the historical Jesus, as Keith and Le Donne amply show. If 
the search for authentic material is no longer tenable, then 
there really is no more Quest. Now, there might be other 
enterprises, other projects relating to the study of Jesus, and 
some of them might be richly rewarding: the study of how 
Jesus was remembered, how memory of Jesus functions in 
the development of Christian community and memory, and 
so on. But it would be misleading to call any of these the 
Quest for the historical Jesus, as if we can take over a game, 
fundamentally change all of its rules, yet still pretend we 
are playing the same game because we keep the name. If the 
search for an authentic, original Jesus has been abandoned, 
rightfully, then really and truly there is no Quest any more.12
Conclusion
In a 2011 book on memory and the historical Jesus, Robert 
McIver puts on full display the frailties of human memory, 
making many scientific studies accessible to the reader 
more interested in Jesus. He is explicit about the problems 
involved with immediate and long-term eyewitness 
reliability, personal event memory, suggestibility, 
distortion and bias. He is also clear about the challenges 
posed by forgetting, memory erosion over time, and that 
flash-bulb memory is not, in fact, more reliable than other 
types of memory. The studies that McIver summarises 
show that human memory is reconstructed in shards, 
often reliably, but always with a considerable loss of detail 
and never recalled in a challenge-free process. Though 
he does have a tendency to over-emphasise reliability, he 
does nonetheless illustrate that memory is reconstructive 
rather than reproductive, in keeping with most cognitive 
and social-scientific research on memory.
Yet, when McIver turns from establishing the frailty of 
memory to the study of the Gospels, it seems that none of 
12.Interestingly, the suggestion that memory theory ought to move us into a new 
No Quest is in keeping with what occurred during the original No Quest (c. 1900–
1950): despite being commonly known as the No Quest, there was in fact work 
being done on Jesus. This work was, however, more existential and theological (à 
la Bultmann), and was concerned less with historical reconstructions.
the preceding work actually applies in any destabilising way 
to the Gospels. For example, McIver claims that the writer of 
Luke knew all of Matthew’s Sondergut, as did the author of 
Matthew know all of Luke’s. It can be inferred that McIver 
holds this position because memory is essentially reliable, 
and because remembering happens in groups, so if the 
author of Matthew knew material, the author of Luke must 
have known it as well. Why do Matthew and Luke lack some 
material the other has? Because, according to McIver, Luke’s 
special material did not suit Matthew’s needs, nor Matthew’s 
special material Luke’s needs. So he concludes, it is ‘rather 
unlikely’ that each did now know of the other’s material. 
Such is the reliability of collective memory!
McIver’s failure of nerve to apply the frailties of memory to 
the Gospels as artefacts of memory are most evident in the 
appendix to his book. Here McIver speculates about how 
many people could have been eyewitnesses to Jesus’ career 
(any part of it), and from there how many could still be 
alive when the Gospels were composed. The demographics 
are unimportant here, and have been questioned elsewhere 
(Crook 2012). Of interest here is McIver’s guiding assumption 
that eyewitnesses relate reliable memory, and the more 
eyewitnesses there are the more reliable the resulting 
memory will be. This explains why, after his demographic 
study, McIver would conclude that it is ‘evident from the life 
tables [that] some surviving eyewitnesses would have been 
available to the Evangelists to consult had they so wished’ 
(McIver 2011:209).
Some people persist in the naïve hope that memory theory 
supports the reliability of the Gospels. Memory theory, 
according to Keener (2009), argues that although: 
[M]emory can be imperfect, there are normally limits to this 
imperfection (i.e., they do not ordinarily involve free composition 
of events); even when some details are inaccurate, the ‘gist’ is 
usually accurate. (p. 145) 
But there are simply too many instances involving the ‘free 
composition of events’ and others for which ‘gist memory’ 
is, as a matter of documentable fact, no more reliable than 
detailed memory. History and lab tests reveal this repeatedly, 
and they cannot be ignored. 
My engagement with memory theory leads me in the 
opposite direction as McIver and Keener. I must reject their 
hopefulness, and conclude that finding the historical Jesus is 
hopeless. Memory does not refine our previous positivistic 
and form-critical criteria, allowing us better to distinguish 
between authentic and inauthentic Jesus material. Neither 
does it provide a new means by which to discover authentic 
Jesus material. Rather, in my opinion, memory theory pushes 
us ever further away from certainty, from confidence in 
assessing authentic material, and in distinguishing it from 
inauthentic material. 
There are two reasons for this. The first is not merely 
that memory (both individual and group) is not entirely 
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trustworthy, but how commonly it is untrustworthy. We 
know this because there are some means by which to assess 
the historical veracity of some sources (realism, common 
sense, the agenda of the author, competing versions, etc.). 
Seeing that some versions of a story are less reliable than 
others illustrates the dynamics of memory distortion. 
The second reason is far more serious: accurate and inaccurate 
memories (or, what I have called ‘manufactured memories’ 
elsewhere) are not qualitatively different. Memory might 
well work most of the time (Schacter 1996:98), but it also 
works poorly much of the time. I must make emphatically 
clear that I am not claiming that memory is always hopelessly 
unreliable, that none of your or my memories are reliable. I 
am also not saying that certain things from the past cannot 
be known with reasonable certainty. I am saying that all we 
know for sure is that our memories feel real and feel reliable, 
but often are not. But more to the point, too often we cannot 
ourselves tell the difference between our own reliable and 
less reliable memories. It is that last point that ought to push 
historical Jesus scholarship to a New No Quest. Questing 
for the historical Jesus can no longer be done because we 
do not have the means for distinguishing between reliable 
and unreliable memory, and because the traditional criteria, 
relied upon for so long, are now bankrupt. 
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